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NON-LIABILITY PRESUMPTION ON INFANT'S
INTENTIONAL TORT REJECTED
Seaburg v. Williams,
16 Ill. 4Pt.2d 295, 148 N.E.2d 49 (1958)
The plaintiff brought an action against a five-year-old child for
tortiously and wrongfully setting fire to a garage thereby destroying the
garage and its contents. On appeal from a judgment sustaining defend-
ant's "motion to strike" on the ground of "failure to state a cause of
action" the appellate court of Illinois remanded, holding that the con-
clusive presumption that a child under seven cannot be guilty of negli-
gence1 did not apply to intentional tort cases.2
Generally, an infant is liable for his tortse but the courts have made
an exception where the tort contained some element which is necessarily
wanting in an infant.4 In the negligence' and criminal' area the law is
well settled regarding his liability. It has long been established that the
common law conferred on an infant no immunity from liability in torts
comparable to an infant's contractual privilege.7
The problem presented in the intentional tort field is whether a
minor should be liable for his actions when he is incapable of realizing
the wrongfulness of his act, i.e., whether the child should only be re-
I Where a child is under seven years of age, he is incapable of contributory
negligence. Between the ages of seven and fourteen he is presumed to be incapable,
but this presumption is rebuttable. Over the age of fourteen he is presumed
capable. Chicago City Ry. v. Tuohy, 196 Ill. 410, 63 N.E. 997 (1902). The criminal
law rule is the same. WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW § 364 (12th ed. 1932) ; Comment,
Incompetency as Affecting Legal Responsibility, 3 ALA. L. REv. 165, 169 (1950-51).
2 Seaburg v. Williams, 16 Il1. App.2d 295, 148 N.E.2d 49 (1958).
3 27 AM. JUR. Infants § 90, 91 (1940) ; 43 C.J.S. Infants § 87 (1945) ; 31 C.J.
Infants § 203 n. 26 (1923); 28 OHIO JuR.2d Infants § 39 (1958). "In the situ-
ation where an infant does, through his agent something which he is entirely
capable of legally doing himself, he should be liable for the torts of such agent
within the scope of his authority." Harrison v. Carroll, 49 F. Supp. 283 (1943).
41"Of the latter class is an action for slander, wherein malice is a necessary
ingredient, and if the infant ... cannot be presumed to be guilty of malice, no
liability attaches for his slanderous utterances." Stephens v. Stephens, 172 Ky. 780,
189 S.W. 1143 (1916). See Stone, Liability for Damages Caused by Minors,
5 ALA. L. RaV. 1, 29 (1952-53).
5 "[C]hildren have been recognized as a special group to whom a more or
less subjective standard of conduct is applied, which will vary according to their
age, intelligence and experience, so that in some cases immunity may be conferred
in effect by finding merely that there has been no negligence." PROSSER, TORTS,
§ 109, at 788-89, (2d ed. 1955) ; COOLEY, TORTS § 66 (1932).
6 Criminal law rule, supra note 1.
7 The general rule applicable to contracts is that an infant may avoid liability
thereon. Brown v. Wood, 293 Mich. 148, 291 N.W. 255 (1940); Lacey v. Laird,
166 Ohio St. 12, 139 N.E.2d 25 (1956); Garrard v. Henderson, 209 S.W.2d 225
(Tex. Civ. App. 1948).
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sponsible for the consequences of his act when he has such maturity of
mind as will enable him to foresee the consequences, s or whether he
should be liable merely because he has the intention of doing the physical
act which causes the injury.9
The vast majority of the courts have been more concerned with the
compensation of the injured party than the moral guilt of the infant and
have refused to hold an infant immune from liability,"0 although in some
jurisdictions immunity has been given 'by statute." Infants have been
held liable for assault and battery, 12 trespassPs and conversion.' Most
of the cases have been based on the broad general principle that when a
loss must be -borne by one of two innocent persons it should be borne by
the actor."5
This concept of liability without fault is an anachronistic symbol
of earlier common law principles.'" The fact that the courts in negli-
gence cases grant immunity to an infant under certain circumstances
demonstrates an inconsistency in the law. As stated by Professor Bohlen:
If our law recognizes infants and insane persons as incapable
of exercising that care for their own protection which is re-
quired of normal persons as a condition to their right to redress
for injuries caused by the wrongful acts of others, and relieves
them from the penalty which such lack of care would, but for
their incapacity, impose, it would be inconsistent and arbitrary
to penalize them by requiring them to compensate others whom
they injure by conduct which, though guility in others, is, by
reason of their incapacity, innocent in them.- -
A leading case dealing with the problem is Garratt v. Dailey'"
where a five-year-old child pulled a chair from under a plaintiff who
was in the process of sitting down. The court remanded for a determi-
8 Unkelsbee v. Homestead Fire Ins. Co., 41 A.2d 168 (D.C. Mun. App. 1945).
9 Note, The Tortious Infant, 97 SOL. J. 614-17 (1953).10 PRosSER, op. cit. supra note 5, at 788.
'lE.g., GA. CODE: § 26-302 (1933); § 105-1806 (1933) "Infancy is no defense
to an action for a tort, provided the defendant has arrived at those years of dis-
cretion and accountability prescribed by this code for criminal offenses." (Grants
immunity to a child under ten years of age.)
12 Singer v. Marx, 144 Cal. App. 2d 637, 301 P.2d 440 (1956); Ellis v.
D'Angelo 116 Cal. App. 2d 310, 253 P.2d 675 (1953) (four-year-old child) ; Garratt
v. Dailey, 46 Wash.2d 197, 279 P.2d 1091 (1955) (five-year-old child).
13 Conklin v. Thompson, 29 Barb. 218 (N.Y. 1859) (trespass to chattels);
Huchting v. Engel, 17 Wis. 230 (1863).
14 Smith v. Moschetti, 213 Ark. 968, 214 S.W.2d 73 (1948) ; Shaw v. Coffin,
58 Me. 254 (1870); Walker v. Davis, 67 Mass. 506 (1854).
35 27 AM. JUR. Infants § 90 (1940).
16 Ellis v. D'Angelo, supra note 12 (dictum).
17 Bohlen, The Liability in Tort of Infants and Insane Persons, 23 MICH. L.
REv. 9, 31 (1924).
18 Supra note 12.
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nation of the child's intent saying: "Without ... knowledge [that the
act was wrongful] . . . there would be no liability." This court required
for liability an intention to commit a wrongful act coupled with the
ability of the infant to maintain such intent. They did not base liability
on mere causation.
Since the injury is the same whether the cause is an intentional or
negligent tort no justifiable reason can be set forth for continuing the
inconsistency in considering an infant's capacity for wrongful intent in
negligence and criminal cases but refusing to consider his capacity in
intentional tort cases."9 If compensation regardless of the infant's ability
to maintain a wrongful intent is the rule, then the law should not give
immunity to infants in the negligence area, but base liability merely on
causation. To do this, however, would be a regression. The ultimate
basis of tort liability should be wrongfulness ;21 therefore, the courts,
when considering intentional torts of infants, should make wrongfulness
and not merely causation a prerequisite for liability.
Edward R. Bunstine
19 Note, 27 So. CALIF. L. REV. 214 (1954).
20 Note, 30 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 119 (195S).
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